Employment Research, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 2005 by unknown
Employment Research Newsletter 
Volume 12 Number 3 Article 3 
7-1-2005 
Employment Research, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 2005 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research 
Citation 
W.E. Upjohn Institute. 2005. Employment Research 12(3). https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.12(3) 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
JULY 2005
Christopher T. King 
and Peter R. Mueser
Urban Welfare and Work
Experiences: Implications
for Welfare Reform
David W. Emmons, Eva Madly, and 
Stephen A. Woodbury
Refundable Tax Credits 
for Health Insurance
Vol. 12, No. 3
Emplovment Research is published 
quarterly by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research. Issues appear in 
January. April, July, and October.
The Institute is a nonprofit research 
organization devoted to finding and / 
promoting solutions to employment-related 
problems at the national, state, and local 
level. The Institute is an activity of the W.E. 
Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, 
which was established in 1932 to administer 
a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn, 
founder of the Upjohn Company, to conduct 
research on the causes and effects of 
unemployment and seek measures for the 
alleviation of the hardships suffered by the 
unemployed.
W.E. Upjohn Institute 
300 S. Westnedge Avenue 
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686 
(269)343-5541 
www.upjohninstitute.org
Randall W. Eberts ' 
Executive Director :;
Christopher T. King and Peter R. Mueser
Urban Welfare
and Work Experiences
Implications for Welfare Reform
NOTE: This article highlights some of the research 
findings that appear in the authors 'new book, 
Welfare and Work: Experiences in Six Cities, which 
is available from the Upjohn Institute (seep. 7).
A he last decade has seen 
extraordinary changes in U.S. welfare 
programs. Even as early as 1970, with 
greater numbers of mothers in paid 
employment, public opinion had begun 
to shift toward an increased emphasis on 
work as an alternative to welfare. The 
shift to an employment-focused system 
gained momentum in the 1990s, initially 
with states modifying Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
under federal waivers, and culminating 
in passage of the federal Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act in 1996. This 
bipartisan legislation, which replaced 
AFDC with Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), established 
explicit program participation and work 
requirements for participants, limited the 
length of time recipients could receive 
aid, and further expanded state autonomy.
Reform-oriented policy changes 
during the 1990s were accompanied by 
major declines in the national caseload. 
After peaking at 5.0 million in 1994, 
caseloads began a decline, falling to 
3.9 million in 1997, the year TANF was 
implemented in most states, and 2.6 
million in 1999, a level not seen since 
1970. While increasing numbers of
families are transitioning from welfare 
to work, whether welfare leavers will 
succeed in achieving stable employment 
and economic self-sufficiency over the 
long term remains in question. Many 
recipients face significant barriers to 
employment, and those who get jobs 
commonly cycle in and out of work, earn 
low wages, and often continue to rely on 
government supports.
In this article we present findings 
from Welfare and Work: Experiences 
in Six Cities, in which we examined 
welfare participation and labor market 
involvement of female welfare recipients 
during the 1990s. Our analysis relied 
on individual-level welfare data linked 
to state earnings records for the core 
counties in six major urban areas  
Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Fort 
Lauderdale, Houston, and Kansas City  
which together accounted for around 5 
percent of the nation's welfare caseload 
in 1991. 1 The selected sites provide 
considerable diversity, as they include 
cities from a very low-benefit state 
(Texas) and a classic northern urban area 
(Chicago), two cities on the border of the 
old South (Baltimore and Kansas City), 
and a traditional southern city (Atlanta). 
Three of the cities have significant 
representation of Hispanics.
The cities chosen also allowed us to 
examine the extent to which differences 
in state and local policy, administrative 
directives, and local labor market
ISSN 1075-8445
Employment Research JULY 2005
conditions contribute to observed 
trends. Policy and administrative 
changes designed to move families 
from the rolls have been facilitated by a 
growing economy, much more so than 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s during 
implementation of earlier reforms. Other 
supportive policy changes including 
expansions of the federal Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC), Medicaid, and child 
care subsidies were also occurring 
during this period.
Caseload declines vary among our 
sites but are substantial. They bracket 
the national decline, ranging from 44 
percent in Kansas City to 81 percent 
in Fort Lauderdale. Many of the legal 
and policy changes following from
Overall, we conclude that the 
kinds of jobs welfare recipients
obtain have not seriously 
deteriorated over the 1990s.
welfare reform focused on the activities 
of recipients, attempting to create both 
incentives and opportunities for them 
to obtain employment and exit welfare. 
Time limits pushed people from the rolls, 
and mandatory programs attempted to 
help recipients build job skills and obtain 
employment. Some elements of welfare 
reform were also designed to reduce entry 
onto welfare. Explicit diversion programs 
were adopted by many states, in some 
cases requiring potential recipients to 
engage in job search before applying 
for welfare. Our analyses show that at 
each of our sites, increases in the welfare
exit rate alone would have produced 
important caseload declines, ranging 
from 30 to 64 percent. Yet declines in 
the numbers entering welfare contributed 
substantially as well, causing caseloads to 
fall by 20 to 71 percent.
Employment of Welfare Leavers
Employment of leavers is of 
particular concern because national 
and state welfare reforms placed 
increased emphasis on this route of 
exit from welfare. Those supporting 
welfare reforms argued that training 
and related provisions, in conjunction 
with work requirements, would move 
welfare families into the world of work, 
providing them with new opportunities 
for betterment. Critics warned that it was 
more likely that reforms would force 
those who were ill-prepared for work to 
seek aid from family, private charities, 
or less restrictive public programs, 
causing increased hardship and ultimately 
damaging the welfare of their children.
Table 1 provides employment rates 
for those exiting welfare in each of 
our sites. We see that rates increased 
substantially between 1994 and 1997 
but changed little between 1997 and 
1999. These results do not accord with 
the views of either the supporters or the 
critics of reform. Moderate increases in 
the employment rates for welfare leavers 
in the face of the extraordinary economic 
growth in the 1990s do not suggest 
unprecedented opportunity for those who 
left welfare. On the other hand, the fact 
that employment rates did not decline






























NOTE: All measures apply to federal fiscal year (October-September) unless indicated otherwise.
Site measures are means for four quarters. 
a Fiscal year 1996. 
SOURCE: Authors'calculations
suggests that reforms were somewhat 
successful in achieving the act's 
employment goals. A fuller understanding 
requires looking at the types of jobs 
welfare leavers obtained and the factors 
determining their employment success.
Looking at Recipients' Jobs
A central goal of welfare reform 
is moving recipients into stable jobs. 
Welfare recipients tend to have unstable, 
short-term jobs, with few benefits and 
low wages. Although we are unable to 
determine benefits, wage records allow 
us to determine how long an employee 
receives earnings from a given employer. 
Table 2 provides information on the 
stability of jobs obtained by welfare 
recipients. Only about half of all jobs 
last beyond the quarter in which they 
start, and this proportion did not change 
appreciably between 1994-1995 and 
1998-1999.
Only 4 10 percent of jobs last eight 
quarters or more. In three of the five sites 
where we can make comparisons, we 
see that the number of such long-term 
jobs has declined. Although these results 
might suggest a decline in the quality of 
jobs welfare recipients obtain, we found 
that similar declines occurred for other 
workers in the same firms. And, even 
where job stability has declined, earnings 
have not. Overall, we conclude that the 
kinds of jobs welfare recipients obtain 
have not seriously deteriorated over the 
1990s.
While changes over time are modest at 
best, by any standard welfare recipients' 
jobs are poor ones. Over the life of the 
job up to two years for our data  
average cumulative earnings are only 
between $2,000 (for Atlanta) and $5,000 
(for Chicago). 2 Few of these jobs lead to 
economic self-sufficiency for mothers 
with one or more dependents. Some 
individuals may obtain sufficient earnings 
to move off of welfare and support their 
families if they succeed in cobbling 
together multiple low-paying jobs into 
a semi-steady earnings stream. Others 
may stumble onto a good job only after 
many tries.
Employment Research JULY 2005
Table 2 Stability of Jobs Held by Welfare Recipients in Six Areas
Probability that job lasts 
more than 1 quarter
Probability that job lasts 




































SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
Finding a Good Job
Although opportunities clearly are 
limited, recipients who obtain the best 
jobs have substantial advantages. In 
all of our areas, the standard deviation 
of total earnings on a job is at least 50 
percent greater than the mean, implying 
that some jobs provide reasonably 
good long-term earnings in these urban 
labor markets. In considering how a 
particular welfare recipient achieves 
stable employment, it is natural to ask
Despite the poor prospects 
offered by the average welfare
recipient's job, we find 
evidence that some jobs do 
offer greater opportunities.
how important individual characteristics 
are in determining job stability and 
earnings. If individual characteristics 
are of primary importance, there is 
little benefit in placing individuals with 
certain employers, since the only route 
to achieving economic self-sufficiency 
will be to augment their human capital. In 
contrast, if certain employers offer highly 
desirable jobs jobs that provide high 
stability and earnings to any incumbent  
individuals lucky enough to land them 
will do relatively well over time.
What factors determine differences in 
earnings and job stability across jobs? We 
find that demographic characteristics play 
a role, but their effects are quite modest. 
In contrast, the industry of the employer 
is of substantial importance. Furthermore, 
when we examine those firms that
employ many welfare recipients, we find 
that employers differ from one another 
quite dramatically. Some employers 
appear to offer unstable employment 
and low wages to all their employees, 
whereas others offer relative stability and 
higher wages.
One may be concerned, however, 
that observed differences between 
employers are the result of unmeasured 
differences between individuals. If some 
employers hire particularly capable 
individuals, but the differences between 
individuals are not readily observable, 
we may mistakenly assume that they 
offer desirable jobs. If this were the case, 
there would be no benefit in placing less 
qualified workers with such employers, 
since they would be expected to face 
summary dismissal. Fortunately, we
are able to examine the importance 
of unmeasured individual factors, 
since many welfare recipients obtain 
multiple jobs. As might be expected, 
our analysis confirms that unmeasured 
differences between individuals do play 
an important role. But we find that even 
after controlling for such person "fixed 
effects," substantial differences between 
jobs remain.
An indication of the extent to which 
jobs differ can be seen by observing 
industry differences. Figure 1 reports the 
total expected earnings for jobs in five 
industries, controlling for unmeasured 
individual characteristics. Although there 
are differences across our sites, variation 
in expected earnings across industries is 
generally consistent. As expected, jobs in 
temporary help services firms provide the 
lowest expected total earnings, reflecting 
both shorter duration of employment and 
lower quarterly earnings. Retail trade 
provides somewhat greater job stability 
and higher earnings, as does restaurant 
work. Manufacturing jobs are appreciably 
better than jobs in these other industries, 
often with total earnings two or three 
times those for temporary help jobs.
Conclusions
The 1990s saw a dramatic shift 
in the character and focus of welfare
Figure 1 Predicted Total Earnings for Job in Selected Industries
Eating, drinking Manufacturing Retail trade, other Temporary help Other service
D Atlanta 11 Baltimore   Chicago   Fort Lauderdale   Houston D Kansas City
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
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in the United States. The proportion 
of recipients working increased 
substantially, and employment also was 
more prevalent among those leaving 
welfare. However, the kinds of jobs 
obtained by welfare recipients did not 
change dramatically. Expected earnings 
and job stability remained low for most 
recipients of cash assistance, and few of 
the jobs recipients landed could assure 
economic self-sufficiency.
Despite the poor prospects offered 
by the average welfare recipient's job, 
we find evidence that some jobs do offer 
greater opportunities. Even recipients 
who have had a string of dead-end or 
short-lived jobs may ultimately be able 
to obtain a job providing a reasonable 
chance for economic self-sufficiency. 
Federal and state reforms of the 
1990s have not altered this dynamic 
significantly. The goal of reduced 
dependency has been attained in that 
fewer individuals now receive cash aid 
and more are working. But there is no 
evidence that reform has substantially 
improved the lives of recipients or former 
recipients.
Congress continues to struggle with 
reauthorizing the Personal Responsibility 
Act, having passed a series of temporary 
extensions since the Act expired at the 
end of September 2002. Yet differences 
between the House and Senate over 
work and participation requirements, 
allowable activities, and other issues 
have been substantial enough to keep 
those bodies from succeeding in Grafting 
new legislation. Our research supports 
the view that the reforms of the 1990s 
were successful in moving individuals 
off the welfare rolls and into jobs. But 
if the ultimate goal is economic self- 
sufficiency and not simply reductions in 
"dependency," revisions of the program 
will need to go far beyond the reforms 
currently envisioned.
Notes
1. Our analysis uses data from the county 
containing the central city. For convenience, we 
refer to each area by the city name.
2. This figure is the sum of earnings for as long 
as the job lasts, up to eight quarters, with earnings 
adjusted for inflation and reported in 1999 fourth- 
quarter dollars.
David W. Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury
Refundable Tax Credits 
for Health Insurance
NOTE: This article summarizes David W. 
Emmons, Eva Madly, and Stephen A. Woodbury's 
"Refundable Tax Credits for Health Insurance: 
The Sensitivity of Simulated Impacts to Assumed 
Behavior, " Upjohn Institute Working Paper 
05-119, 2005. See http://www.upjohninstitute.org/ 
publications/wp/05-119.pdf.
Dissatisfaction with the level 
and growth of the share of the U.S. 
population without health insurance 
has spurred interest in alternatives to 
the existing system of financing health 
care, which is dominated by employer- 
provided health insurance among the 
nonpoor and nonelderly. One approach 
to reform would be to adopt a refundable 
tax credit for health insurance under 
the federal personal income tax. Such a 
policy would grant a tax credit up to a 
prespecified maximum for example, 
$1,000 for an individual or $2,000 for a
Clearly, these wide simulated
ranges highlight the uncertainty
inherent in modeling the effects
of health insurance tax credits.
family on a tax return where the filer 
purchased a private, nonemployer health 
insurance policy. For filers whose tax 
bill was less than the amount paid for 
insurance, the difference between the tax 
bill and the credit would be paid to the 
filer hence, the refundable nature of the 
tax credit.
The refundable tax credit is attractive 
for at least two reasons. First, it would 
make the same tax-favored treatment 
of health insurance available to all 
individuals, regardless of whether 
they are employed and regardless of 
whether their employer provides a 
health insurance plan. As a result, it 
should increase the number of insured 
individuals and decrease uninsurance. 
Second, a tax credit would generate 
growth in the market for private 
nonemployer health insurance and
increase the population of health care 
consumers that have an interest in 
the characteristics and cost of their 
coverage. These informed, cost-conscious 
consumers could put a brake on 
increasing health care costs.
The extent to which a tax credit for 
health insurance would reduce the 
number of uninsured individuals has been 
controversial. Pauly, Song, and Herring 
(2001) and others have simulated a 
variety of different tax credit policies and 
have found that a "reasonably generous" 
credit could reduce the number of 
uninsured individuals on the order of 50 
percent. However, simulations by Gruber 
(2000a,b) suggest that a health insurance 
tax credit might reduce the number of 
uninsured by only about 10 percent.
Here, we summarize a recent study 
replicating and extending Gruber's 
simulations (Emmons, Madly, and 
Woodbury 2005). Our goal is to 
illuminate Gruber's modeling of health 
insurance coverage under a tax credit and 
to examine the sensitivity of the results to 
changes in the model's key parameters; 
that is, we want to understand what 
makes the simulation model tick. The 
findings from this exercise are most 
relevant to Gruber's widely discussed 
findings and to the particular tax credit 
analyzed. The simulations should not be 
interpreted as being relevant to proposals 
that, for example, would cover different 
populations, would apply tax credits of a 
different amount, or would eliminate the 
exclusion of employer contributions for 
employees' health insurance premiums 
from employees' taxable income.
Outline of the Simulation Model
The simulation model we use is 
essentially a set of rules for determining 
whether a given individual (or family) 
would take up a federal refundable tax 
credit of $1,000 (for a single individual)
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or $2,000 (for a family) for privately 
purchased health insurance. We follow 
Gruber in identifying four groups, each 
facing different circumstances with 
respect to health insurance:
1) those currently covered by employer- 
provided group health insurance,
2) those covered by private 
nonemployer insurance,
3) those covered by Medicaid,
4) those currently uninsured.
For each group, we specify an 
equation for the tax credit take-up rate  
the probability of a person accepting the 
tax credit. We also vary each take-up rate 
equation so as to give a lower-bound and 
an upper-bound take-up rate for each 
group.
For individuals currently covered 
by employer-provided group health 
insurance, we assume a lower-bound 
elasticity of take-up with respect to the 
subsidy provided by the tax credit of 
0.625 (relatively unresponsive behavior) 
and an upper-bound elasticity of infinity 
(that is, a worker with employer- 
provided health insurance accepts the 
credit whenever he or she would incur 
lower expenses by doing so). For those 
currently covered by private nonemployer 
health insurance, the lower-bound 
assumption is that 50 percent would 
take up the credit, and the upper-bound 
assumption is that 90 percent would take 
up the credit.
For those currently covered by 
Medicaid, we assume an elasticity of 
take-up with respect to the credit subsidy 
of 0.2. We then obtain lower-bound 
estimates of the take-up rate by imputing 
(or assigning) health insurance costs 
and expenditures to an entire family, 
and upper-bound estimates by imputing 
costs and expenditures to each individual 
separately. For currently uninsured 
families and individuals, we assume 
the probability of taking up the credit 
depends on income and the size of the 
subsidy, with an elasticity of take-up with 
respect to the subsidy of 0.625. Lower- 
and upper-bound take-up rates again 
come from imputing health insurance 
costs and expenditures to an entire family 
and to each individual separately.
Table 1 Results of Simulation: Group Take-Up Rates, Number of Individuals 




individuals accepting Net government 
(millions) cost ($ billions)
(3) (4) (5) (6)
lower upper lower upper
bound bound bound bound
1) Covered by employer- 
provided group insurance"
a. Hedonic imputation of 3.3 21.6 
employer contribution
b. BLS imputation of 7.4 35.4 
employer contribution
2) Covered by private 50.0 90.0 
nonemployer insurance*5
3) Covered by Medicaidc 3.3 6.7
4) Uninsured0 17.5 28.3
Total    
4.9 32.4 1.9
.11.1 53.2 5.5 22.0
10.4 18.6 9.5 17.1
0.6 1.3 -2.2 -4.9
7.7 12.5 7.4 9.7
23.6-29.8 64.8-85.6 16.6-85.6 31.7-43.9
a For individuals covered by employer-provided group health insurance, lower-bound simulations assume 
an elasticity of take-up with respect to the tax subsidy of 0.625; upper-bound simulations are based on the 
assumption that all workers who would reduce their expenses by switching to private insurance do so. The 
alternative simulations for individuals covered by employer-provided insurance are based on two alternative 
imputations of the worker's contribution to employer-provided group health insurance. 
b For individuals covered by private nonemployer insurance, lower-bound simulations are based on the 
assumption that 50 percent of covered individuals accept the tax credit; upper-bound simulations are based on 
the assumption that 90 percent accept the tax credit.
c For individuals covered by Medicaid and for uninsured individuals, lower-bound simulations are based on 
the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made for entire families; upper-bound simulations 
are based on the assumption that decisions to accept the tax credit are made individually. 
SOURCE: Authors'calculations. ,
The simulations are based on the 
March 1999 annual demographic file of 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
which has data on 132,324 individuals 
under age 65. We supplement the CPS 
with the 1999 Survey of Employer- 
Sponsored Health Benefits, conducted 
by the Kaiser Family Foundation and 
the Health Research and Education Trust 
because the March CPS does not include 
data on the health insurance premiums 
paid by employers, or on employees' 
contributions for employer-provided 
insurance.
What the Simulations Suggest
Table 1 displays the main results of the 
simulation model outlined above take- 
up rates (columns 1 and 2), the number 
of individuals accepting the tax credit 
(columns 3 and 4), and the government's 
net cost of a refundable tax credit 
(columns 5 and 6). Except for those
already covered by private insurance, the 
figures reflect the number of individuals 
who switch from their current health 
insurance status to private nonemployer 
insurance.
For individuals currently covered 
by employer-provided group health 
insurance, the simulations yield a 
broad range of take-up rates from 
3.3 to 35.4 percent, depending on the 
underlying assumptions. Simulated 
ranges for the number of individuals 
who would switch from employer- 
provided to private insurance (5-53 
million) and for the government's tax 
expenditures on this group ($1.9-$22 
billion) are correspondingly broad. The 
lower-bound estimate of 3.3 percent is 
very close to Gruber's estimate of 3.2 
percent, suggesting we have succeeded in 
replicating Gruber's simulations.
For individuals covered by private 
nonemployer insurance, the take-up rate 
is assumed to be 50 percent (the lower-
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bound) or 90 percent (the upper-bound). 
The implication is that between 10.4 and 
18.6 million privately insured individuals 
would accept the tax credit, and that 
government expenditures on tax credits to 
these individuals would range from $9.5 
to $17 billion (row 3 of Table 1).
For individuals covered by Medicaid, 
the simulation model gives a take-up 
rate of between 3.3 and 6.7 percent, 
which implies that between 0.6 and 
1.3 million current Medicaid recipients 
would switch to private insurance (row 
4 of Table 1). Net government costs 
for those initially covered by Medicaid 
actually fall by $2.2-$4.9 billion 
because it is less expensive to subsidize 
private nonemployer insurance for these 
individuals than to provide them with 
Medicaid.
For the uninsured, the simulations 
yield a lower-bound take-up rate of 17.5 
percent and an upper-bound take-up 
rate of 28.3 percent. It follows that the 
tax credit would reduce the number of 
uninsured by 7.7-12.5 million from 
about 44 million (or 18.4 percent of the 
nonelderly U.S. population) to between 
31.5 and 36.3 million (or between 13.2 
and 15.2 percent). Gruber's take-up rate 
(and the corresponding reduction in the 
uninsured population) is somewhat lower 
than our lower-bound estimate, but we 
come close to replicating his findings.
The simulations suggest that tax 
credit expenditures on those who were 
previously uninsured would be between 
$7.4 and $9.7 billion or between $776 
and $961 per newly insured person. 
However, the net government cost of 
the tax credit ranges from about $16.6 
to nearly $44 billion because the credit 
can be used by groups other than the 
previously uninsured. If the low end of 
the range ($16.6 billion) pertains, then 
the average cost to insure a previously 
uninsured person under the tax credit 
would be just over $2,100. However, if 
the high end ($43.9 billion) pertains, then 
the average cost per previously uninsured 
person would be about $3,500.
Discussion
What do we learn from these 
simulations? Our replications and
extensions of Gruber's (2000a,b) 
simulations suggest that a refundable tax 
credit of $ 1,000 for a single individual 
or $2,000 for a family for private health 
insurance would reduce the number 
of uninsured individuals by between 
17.5 and 28 percent and require new 
government expenditures of between 
$16.6 and $44 billion, of which about 
$7.4-$9.7 billion would be for coverage 
of previously uninsured individuals.
Clearly, these wide simulated ranges 
highlight the uncertainty inherent in 
modeling the effects of health insurance 
tax credits. Pauly, Song, and Herring 
(2001) point to model specification and 
assumptions about the premiums faced 
by the uninsured as the main sources of 
uncertainty. These add up to uncertainty 
about individual and family take-up 
rates, and, as they write, "this uncertainty 
... should be front and center in the 
evaluation of tax credit schemes since we 
as analysts have minimal experience with 
large subsidies directed at low-income 
individuals." In addition, some tax credit 
proposals could lead to broader changes 
in health insurance markets, such as 
greater price competition among insurers. 
This is yet another source of uncertainty 
in modeling tax credit proposals.
The next question is whether direct 
empirical evidence could reduce 
uncertainty about tax credit take-up rates. 
Remler, Rachlin, and Glied (2001) and 
Currie (2004) have reviewed evidence 
on the take-up of a wide variety of social 
programs and show that take-up rates 
vary greatly from program to program. 
Their reviews suggest that little basis 
exists for choosing a most likely point 
estimate from the range of simulated 
take-up rates shown in Table 1 the 
lower-bound estimates in column 1 of 
Table 1 may well be too low, and the 
upper-bound estimates in column 2 may 
be optimistically high, but little more can 
be said.
Obtaining convincing empirical 
evidence on take-up of a health insurance 
tax credit will not be cheap it may 
require a demonstration project or social 
experiment. But progress on the issue 
of tax credits for health insurance will 
require improved evidence on the likely 
take-up rate of a credit, and the time and
expense of such a demonstration may 
well be justified if it leads to convincing 
estimates of how tax credits would expand 
coverage and what they would cost.
David W. Emmons is Director of the Center for 
Health Policy Research at the American Medical 
Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Eva Madly is a research analyst at the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute.
Stephen A. Woodbury is a professor of 
economics at Michigan State University and a 
senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute.
This article reflects the opinions of the authors 
and should not be interpreted as representing the 
views of the organizations for which they work.
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2005 First Round Grant Awards
This year, the Institute s Research Grant and Mini-Grant 
Programs were changed to include two funding cycles. We are 
pleased to announce the recipients of grants given under the 
first cycle. They are as follows:
Research Grants
Rachel Connelly, Bowdoin College, and Jean Kimmel, Western 
Michigan University, on the topic "The Role of Caregiving in 
Mothers' Time Use: Recent Evidence from the New American 
Time Use Survey."
Harry Holzer, Georgetown University, and Carolyn Hill, 
Georgetown University, on the topic "Education and 
Employment Outcomes of Minority Youth: What Determines 
Success or Failure?"
New This Year: A Second Round of Grants
Mini-Grants
Jean Abraham, University of Minnesota, on the topic "Valuing 
Variety: How Much Do Workers Value Having Choices among 
Health Insurance Plans?"
Cynthia Bansak, San Diego State University, on the topic "The 
Effects of Public Health Insurance on Job Lock: A Study of the 
State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)."
Sarah Hamersma, University of Florida, on the topic "The Use 
of Federal Work Opportunity and Welfare-to-work Tax Credits 
by Temporary Help Service Firms and their Implications for 
Workers' Labor Market Outcomes."
Luojia Hu, Northwestern University, on the topic "Layoffs and 
Lemons: the Racial and Gender Disparities."
Robert Turner, Skidmore College, on the topic "Who Benefits 
When Enterprise Zones Are Zoned Out? The Case of the Ohio 
Enterprise Zone Program."
The deadline to apply for research grants under this year s second cycle is August 2, 2005. Mini-grant proposals under the second 
cycle are due October 18, 2005. For more information visit http://www.upjohninstitute.org/grantann.html.
New Books
Unemployment Compensation 
Throughout the World: 
A Comparative Analysis
Wayne Vroman & Vera Brusentsev
Vroman and Brusentsev achieve 
four principal objectives: 1) to establish 
the link between macroeconomic 
performance in the product market and 
in the labor market and to argue for the 
role of unemployment protection; 2) to 
provide an overview of Unemployment 
Compensation (UC) programs throughout 
the world, including case studies of 
individual countries in four specific 
regions that highlight the unique 
difficulties facing UC programs in each 
of the four regions; 3) to introduce the 
reader to the issue of actuarial costs of 
UC programs; and 4) to discuss three 
important problem areas facing UC  
coverage, continuing benefit eligibility, 
and policies to shorten the duration of 
unemployment and UC benefit duration.
273 pp. $41 cloth ISBN 0-88099-323-5 / 
$20 paper ISBN 0-88099-322-7 / 2005.
Welfare and Work 
Experiences in Six Cities
Christopher T. King & Peter R. Mueser
The authors examine changes in 
welfare participation and labor market 
involvement of welfare recipients in 
six major cities 
during the 1990s. 
This allows them to 
determine the extent 
to which differences 




conditions contribute to the trends in 
caseloads, employment, and well-being 
observed among former recipients.
200 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-319-7 / 




The Economics of 
Sustainable Development
Sisay Asefa, Editor
This book provides an economic 
perspective on a number of critical issues 







and property rights. 
Contributors are 
Malcolm Gillis, 
E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, 
Vernon W. Ruttan, David Lam, Daniel W. 
Bromley, and Scott M. Swinton.
191 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-321-9 / 
$15 paper ISBN 0-88099-320-0 / 2005.
The first chapters of these books are available to read at our Web site: 
http: //www. upj ohninstitute.org.
ORDER FORM
Book/Author Qty Cloth Qty Paper Total Price
Unemployment Compensation Throughout the World: 
A Comparative Analysis
Vroman and Brusentsev / __ @ $41 __ @ $20
Welfare and Work: Experiences in Six Cities
King and Mueser






U.S.A. and Canada: $4.00 first book, $1.00 each additional book.





BILL TO: (Must attach purchase order)
State Zip
Name Organization
Address City State Zip
To order a publication or request a catalog, mail 
phone, fax or e-mail:
W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE






PAYMENT: All orders must include check, credit 
card information, or purchase order. Checks must 
be payable to the W.E. Upjohn Institute in U.S. 
funds drawn on a U.S. bank. All prices are subject 
to change without notice.
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